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INTRODUCTION

Electronic commerce is growing rapidly. It should contribute to economic growth, improve industry competitiveness, and stimulate investment and innovation. However, its fast development raises some
concerns about its legal framework.
As an example of electronic commerce's ("e-commerce") multiple
challenges, evolving business practice shows an increasing use of "electronic agents," in other words, of automated means playing a role in mediating interaction between users and web-based companies.1 These
electronic agents, by concluding contracts without any human interaction, allow the reduction of transactional costs and broad comparative
shopping. However, lawyers have expressed doubts about the validity of
2
contracts transacted by such electronic agents.
Both the European Union and the United States authorities have
expressed their wish to regulate e-commerce by attempting to adopt a
clear legal framework that could serve as a model for international
movements to unify laws applicable to intercontinental transactions. 3
1. See R. Julid-Barcel6, Electronic Contracts, 15 COMPUTER L. SEC. REP. 3, 153 (1999);
Robert D. Macredie, MediatingBuyer-Seller Interactions:The Role of Agents in Web Commerce, 8 ELEC. MKT. 3, 40 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?,9 HARv.
J. L. & TECH. 25 (1996).
3. See the proposal for a EuropeanParliamentand council Directive on certain legal
aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market, (visited March 14, 2000) <http'J/eu-

ropa.eu.int/commi/internalmarket/enmediaeleccomm/eleccomm.htm).
This proposition
has been adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 7, 1999 and was adopted by the
European Parliament on May 4, 2000. From the American side, despite years of controversies, the National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Law (NCCUSL)
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Their approaches regarding electronic agents differ considerably however. The European Union does not propose any rule directly dealing
with the question of the use of electronic agents. It only addresses the
question in the commentary of one article, specifying that Member
States may not prevent the use of certain electronic systems as intelligent electronic agents. 4 The United States has adopted a set of articles
dealing with the issue.
Our primary task in writing this article is to find which legal solution best answers the concerns that both common and civil laws5 may
have when approaching the use of electronic agents. This article will
primarily focus on the question of the validity of contracts concluded by
electronic agents, although we are conscious that the use of electronic
agents may raise other questions.
First, we will briefly try to deal with some technical considerations.
Second, we will analysis the most important legal questions that the use
of electronic agents raises. Third, and most importantly, we will focus on
the question of how the actual law could offer answers by minor adaptations. Next, we will discuss the solution provided by the United States
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") and suggest
different approaches. Finally, we will analyze some practical implications of our approach.
II.

SOME TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Electronic agents are intelligent software that search the Internet
for some alternatives across a range of prices and valued-added options
proposing an adequate transaction, while taking our demand into account. The agent will even conduct the entire negotiation based on des6
ignated criteria.
As such:
Unlike traditional software, software agents are personalized, continuously running and semi-autonomous. These qualities are conducive for
optimizing the whole buying experience and revolutionizing commerce,
passed on July 24, 1999 a model law to regulate electronic commerce: The Uniform Computer Transactions Act (UCITA). See Index of Ilibrary/ulc/ucita(visited January 19,
2000) <http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclucita>. For a general overview of e-commerce
in both the United States and Europe, see David Chruch, Mike Pullen & Jane K. Winn,
Recent Developments Regarding U.S. and EU Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 33 INr'L
LAw. 347, 351 (1999).
4. See the proposal for a EuropeanParliamentand council Directive on certain legal
aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market, supra note 3.
5. For the purpose of this analysis, by civil law, we refer mainly to Belgian, French,
Spanish and Italian Law.
6. See Lorin Brenman, The Public Policy of Information Licensing, 36 Hous. L. REv.
107 (1999).
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as we know it today. For example, a company which needs to order
additional paper supplies could have agents monitoring the quantity
and usage patterns of paper within the company, launching buying
agents when supplies are becoming low. Those buying agents automatically collect information on vendors and products that may fit the needs
of the company, evaluate the different offerings, make a decision on
which merchants and products to pursue, negotiate the terms of transactions with these merchants and products and finally place orders and
7
make automated payments.
As the cited example shows, these intelligent software packages are
entirely free to decide when transactions may occur and to negotiate the
terms of the contract according to the way they were programmed. Technology can offer even more though, and as Allen and Widdison pointed
out:
[Diespite slow and halting progress in artificial intelligence (AI) research, computer systems are now emerging that can operate not just
automatically but autonomously. Autonomous machines can learn
through experience, modify the instructions in their own programs and
even device new instructions. They can make decisions based on these
self-modified or self-created instructions. These processes include making choices, forming intentions, reaching decisions and giving or withholding consent. 8
With these kinds of electronic agents, contracts can be formed without the parties using them having any knowledge of their existence and
terms. This scenario, as the following analysis will demonstrate, offends
the traditional concepts that lawyers are familiar with.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE USE OF
ELECTRONIC AGENTS
Either or both parties to a contract may use an electronic agent. As
we will discover, such use concerns lawyers on at least two points:
First, because contracts concluded by electronic agents would not be
valid and therefore would be unenforceable. Indeed, the fundamental
conditions of contract formation would not be fulfilled. A computer does
not have the capacity to express consent. 9 Therefore the civil law "ex7. Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman & Alexandros G. Moukas, Agents that Buy and
Sell: Transforming Commerce as we Know It, (visited September 20, 1999) <http'J/ecommerce.media.mit.edu>.
8. See Allen & Widdison, supra note 2, at 26-27.
9. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir.
1972) (staing that computers operate only as commanded by their human programmers).
See also Mads Bryde Andersen, ElectronicCommerce: A Challenge to PrivateLaw?, Centro
di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato, diretto da M.J. Bonell, 32 Saggi, conferenze E
Seminari, 11 and 12 (1998) (visited December 9, 1999) (available at <http://www.cnr.it/
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change of consent" and common law "mutual assent" conditions would
not be fulfilled.
Secondly, and this objection is directly linked to the first one, accepting the fact that a machine could autonomously be a party in a contract would generate liability problems in case of non-performance or
error. For purposes of this article, our analysis will mainly focus on the
validity issue, with some emphasis on the liability problem.
As Professor Poullet pointed out, the problem of the validity of contracts concluded through or with the assistance of electronic agents is
not absolutely new. 10 It has been dealt with in the context of Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI) transactions. He reminds us, however, that the
discrepancies between the contractual situations created in the context
of EDI transactions and those currently envisaged under the concept of
contracts concluded through electronic agent are quite important. As a
matter of fact, EDI transactions were often taking place within closed
user groups between well-identified parties. In such a context, it is quite
easy for the parties to conclude a framework contract with a provision
asserting that all the transactions effected on the basis of the contract
will be concluded validly by the sole use of electronic means and might
not be disavowed by the parties for this reason. With the Internet, however, such a solution is difficult.
Indeed, "in case of contracts concluded in an open environment with
people not necessarily previously identified or identifiable, such a solution is more difficult.... [slo the question as to know whether the validity of a contract concluded through electronic agent might exist
independently of any global contract is still to be debated."'
As many different analyses have been conducted on this topic, the
next section will explore the majority of them by providing some critical
analysis.
IV.

SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY CONTRACTUAL LAW

The first reflex lawyers have when encountering new areas of law is
to begin their analysis by looking into general principles, using and
adapting them to fit and offer a proper answer to legal concerns. This
section will attempt to deal with general contract principles; both used in
civil and common law and analyze how they could offer a solution to legalize the use of electronic agents. A first point will be devoted to the
CRDCS/97_98.htm>) (discussing that most jurisdictions still require some kind of subjective intent in order for contractual obligations to occur).
10. Yves Poullet, Conclude a Contract Through ElectronicAgents? (1999) (unpublished
research paper for the Research Center for Computer Law, University of Namur) (on file
with The John Marshall Journal of Computer and InformationLaw).
11. Id. at 6.
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theory of agency. The second will deal with the question of how far the
theory of artificial intelligence and legal personhood may provide some
help to reinforce the agency theory. The third point will focus on the civil
law theory of appearance. Finally, in the last section, we will work on
the notion of consent.
A.

COMPUTERS AS AGENTS

When approaching the notion of electronic agents, lawyers are immediately tempted to make a parallelism with the theory of agency. After all, computers only replace what human agents are normally doing.
According to Fischer, the comparison seems obvious:
When computers are given the capacity to communicate with each other
based upon preprogrammed instructions, and when they possess the
physical capability to execute agreements on shipments of goods without any human awareness or input into the agreements beyond the
original programming of the computer's instructions, these computers
serve the same function as similarly instructed human agents of a party
and thus should be treated under the law identically to those human
agents. 12
The evidence and the apparent simplicity of his theory almost lead
us to forget the complexity of the question. Still, his reasoning fails to
convince at different levels.
Fisher reasonably recognizes that according to the Restatement of
Agency, 13 "to create a principal-agent relationship under agency law, the
consent of both parties is necessary .... In a principal-computer-agent
relationship, the concept of the computer consenting is absurd."1 4 The
same objection would be raised under European Union law. 15 Fisher
therefore must resort obliged to a presumption or a legal fiction of consent to supply the deficiency of agency law. Using a presumption of consent, one can wonder if the theory of agency still presents any interest.
In addition, such a theory is particularly troublesome since it raises another problem when used. Indeed, under agency law, the agent may be
liable for his acts. Since computers are not considered as capable under
12. John P. Fisher, Computers as Agents: A ProposedApproach to Revised U.C.C. Article 2, 72 IND. L. J. 545, 570 (1997).
13.

RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).

14. Fisher, supra note 12, at 569. But see Jeff C. Dodd & James A. Hernandez, Contracting in Cyberspace, 1998 COMPUTER L. R. & TECH. J. 1, 5. Those authors seem to hesitate: "It is not clear that agency law, in the absence of an agreement or statute would
recognize the power of computers to bind, though they may be programmed to take actions." Id.
15. See the Council Directive 86/653/EEC of December 18, 1986 (visited June 17,
1999) <http'//europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/datl986/en_386L0653.html>; see also P. W~ry, Le
Mandat,COLLECTION REPERTOIRE NOTARIAL § 2 (1999) (stating that the liberty of the principal does not allow him to designate a person without any capacity of discernment).
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the law, they may not be considered liable for their acts. Fisher, aware of
this argument, simply states that "assuming that the only parts of
agency are relevant to the question of computer agents, are the parts
relating to the functions an agent serves for its principal, one must conclude that the part of the capacity concept relating to the liability of the
agent is irrelevant." 16 This second threat to the agency theory leaves
one skeptical.
Finally, it seems that the theory of agency does not fully resolve the
question of the legitimacy of contracts entered into by electronic agents.
Fisher does not provide any solution to the problem of liability. Moreover, the validity of such contracts would only be recognized under the
fiction that computers would have the capacity to consent to a transaction. In such a case does the parallelism with agency still make any
sense? On the contrary, it seems that there should be simpler ways to
reach the same result.
Fisher's theory would be of interest only if one recognizes the same
rights in a computer as those that are conferred to a human person or a
legal entity. Is it however realistic? The next section will try to provide
some attempt of an answer.
B.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD

Could contract law accommodate the idea of conferring legal personality to a computer? Such an issue is complex. We will hereafter confine
our analysis to the pros and cons of the recognition of such personality
17
for computer.
The advocates of conferring legal personality to the computer estimate that when a computer has a social capacity for autonomous actions,
there is no reason to treat it differently than a human being. So, according to Solum, "a system which achieves self-consciousness is morally entitled to be treated as a legal person and the fact that self-consciousness
does not emerge from biological processes should not disqualify it from
legal personality."' 8
Wein argues that "unattended intelligent artifacts should be subject
to liability, independent of human masters, on consideration of universal
concepts of accountability underlying legal systems throughout history."19 According to him, one should be allowed to directly sue a
machine because "sometimes the (human) decision to program or design
16. Fisher, supra note 12, at 561.
17. See Allen & Widdison supra note 2, at 35.
18. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences, 70 North Carolina Law Review, 1231 (1992).
19. Leon E. Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automated
Jurisprudence,6 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 103 and f. (1992).
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a certain way may be non-negligent, while the (computer) decision to behave a certain way in an individual situation would be considered negligent if the computer could be sued." 20 As the quoted sentence shows,
Wein clearly pleads for the recognition of machines to be the bearers of
duties and possessors of rights, even if they could insulate the human
principal from liability.
Supposing that this solution is philosophically admissible and that a
clear notion of computers' negligence comes to light, it could resolve the
problem that the use of electronic agents generate regarding their capacity to express consent. Indeed, if one applies the theory of agency, it
would no longer be necessary to entertain the fiction that computers
have the capacity to consent. Moreover, the problem of liability would be
solved since the computer could be held "personally" liable for any mistake or negligence. This approach, however, raises several objections.
First, let us remember our original proposition to look for a solution
that could satisfy both common law and civil law systems and serve as a
model for an international movement to unify law in this area. It should
therefore be pointed out that, for numerous countries, the existence of a
"patrimony," in other words, capital or a certain amount of assets is essential to grant the legal personality. 2 1 Does it make sense to attribute a
patrimony to a computer?
As far as we know, this important question has never been given a
proper answer. This is particularly regrettable since it affects the liability system in itself.22 What is the point in declaring a computer liable if
20. Id. at 114.
21. See for example in France and in Belgium, Aubry et Rau, Cours de droit civil franVais, Paris, Imprimerie et librairie g~ndrale de Jurisprudence, Marchal et Billard, 56me 6d,
tome 2, 1897, p.3 . Gaston Lagarde, Droit Commercial, T. 1, Ed. 2, Paris, Dalloz, p.59 and f.
(1980), Christian Jassogne (sous Ia direction de), Traitgpratiquede droit commercial, T. 4,
Les socit6s, Bruxelles, Story-Scientia, p.9 and f., (1998). See also Eric A. Caprioli, Consentement et syst~mes d'information, 4 Revue de la recherche juridique droit prospectif
1075, at 1079-1080 (1999). For the latter, "Mme si les attributs des personnes physiques
ne sont pas transposables aux personnes morales, la personnalit6 juridique comporte trois
sortes d'attributs communs aux deux: un patrimoine, des droits extra-patrimoniaux et enfin, le droit d'agir en justice. (... ) Juridiquement, les systhmes d'information n'existent pas
en tant que personne civile, mais en tant que biens, faisant partie d'un patrimoine; ce
dernier dtant le signe d'une personne physique ou morale. Les systAmes d'information sont
des objets de droit et non pas des sujets."
22. See in the same meaning, Vincent Gautrais, L'encadrementjuridique du contrat
dlectronique international,Th~se, Universite de Monrdal, at 228 (1998). The author clearly
states:
...il ne sert A rien de donner cette capacitd juridique A une machine dans la
mesure o i un lien de responsabilitk, pour le moins, doit 6tre tracd entre la
machine et la personne qui est derriere. Ainsi, en cas d'erreur et effectud par une
machine juridiquement capable et d'un dommage consdcutif, il faut de toutes les
mani~res "attribuer" le lien de causalit6 a la personne physique ou morale responsable de l'opdration."

1999]

ELECTRONIC AGENTS QUESTIONED

it lacks personal assets? It does not seem to be a major problem for Solum, at least in the context of civil liability. As a solution to this problem
the author suggests that the artificial intelligence (AI) might purchase
insurance. "If the AI could insure, at a reasonable cost, against the risk
that it would be found liable for breaching the duty to exercise reasonable care, against the risk that it would be found liable for breaching the
duty to exercise reasonable care, then functionally the AI would be able
to assume both the duty and the corresponding liability." 23 Are, however, insurance companies ready to insure such kind of risks? What
would be the costs of such insurance? In addition to such financial issues, what would be the fate of the risks the companies refuse to cover?
What will occur if the "intelligent computer" negligently forgets to pay
the monthly fees to the company? The numerous questions raised by
this assertion clearly demonstrates that Solum's suggestion is not realistic. Finally, one can further object that, for computers to be treated as
legal persons, a system of registration will have to be developed. As Allen
and Widdison pointed out, "ultimately, it is possible that the costs of a
system of registration would mean that the conferral of personality
24
would prove too expensive to justify itself."
The idea to grant computers with legal personality may have great
appeal for some persons, but as this analysis demonstrates, the above
non-exclusive objections outweigh any advantages this model may
provide.25
C.

THE THEORY OF THE APPEARANCE OR THE LEGITIMATE RELIANCE:
A SOLUTION FOR THE CIVIL LAW?

In his attempt to find a solution to allow conclusion of contracts by
computers, Professor Poullet has expressed the opinion that "the Code
civil theory of the appearance, considered as a source of obligations,
might solve the problem taking into account the needed balances between the interests of the user of these technologies and the contracting
Id.
23. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal personhood for Artificial Intelligences, supra note 18, at
1245.
24. T. Allen & R. Widdison, supra note 2, at 42.
25. Contra, Eric A. Caprioli, supra note 21, at 1091. The author seems to advocate the
utility to think about the recognition of a new kind of legal personhood: "En d6finitive, les
systhmes d'information sont des instruments de m6diation entre les hommes; le consentement, quand bien mgme serait-il cens6 8tre exprim6 par une machine sera toujours attribu6 A une personne. Afin d'6tablir une ouverture sur des futures perspectives
d'6volutions juridiques, il resterait A envisager un nouveau sujet de droit, sidgeant 6 c6t
des personnes morales: b savoir des rtres virtuels, sans doutes dotes d'une intelligence
artificielle et A qui la loi reconnaitrait une certaine personnalit6 juridique." The author,
however, does not give us any track of reflection regarding how such a new subject of
rights could be legally organized.
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26

party."
The theory of the appearance or the legitimate reliance advocates as
autonomous source of binding obligations the creation vis-a-vis third
parties of a legitimate faith in an apparent situation. 2 7 This theory may
be justified by a consideration of equity and legal security taking into
account the position of the victim of the semblance.
Four conditions must be fulfilled for the appearance being a source
2s
of obligation:
1. The apparent situation must not correspond with the real
situation.
2. The reliance by the third party that the appearance corresponds
to the reality must be legitimate. The condition will only be considered as fulfilled if the third party acts in good faith, which
means that he must not be aware of the real situation. Once he
knows the real situation, he is no longer authorized to invoke the
theory of appearance. The legitimate exigency means that the
third party must reasonably not know the real situation. The
third party has a reasonable duty to inform himself. The extent
of such a duty will be determined according to the factual
conditions.
3. The creation of the false appearance must be attributable to the
party against whom the theory is invoked. This supposes that
the party could control the functioning of the electronic agent and
avoid any mistake.
4. There must be damage to the third party if no effect is given to
the apparent situation.
29
This theory offers civil law countries which recognize this theory
26. Y. Poullet, supra (note 10), at 9.
27. Sophie Stijns, Dirk Van Gerven & Patrick W~ry, Chronique de Jurisprudence,les
obligations:les sources (1985-1995), Journal des Tribunaux, 689 and f (1996). See also R.
Kruithof, La theorie de l'apparencedans une nouvelle phase, note sous Cass., Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Belge, 45 and f (1991).
28. P.-A. Foriers, L'apparence, source autonome d'obligations, ou application du
principe gdndralde bonne foi. Apropos de l'Arrtde la Cour de Cassationdu 20 juin 1988,
Journal des Tribunaux, 543 and f (1989).
29. See among others and as a non limitative quotation, the law and authors quoted by
Y. Poullet (Y. Poullet, supra note 10, at 9.): As regards the French legal doctrine, see J.
Calais-Auloy, Essai sur la notion d'apparence en droit commercial, Th~se, LGDJ, Paris,
(1959); J. Derrida and J. Mestre, Encycl. Droit civil Dalloz, v. Apparence; as regards the
Spanish legal doctrine, A. Gordillo, La Representacionaparente, Thesis, Sevilla, (1978). See
also Jacques Ghestin, Les effets du contrat, L.G.D.J., p. 642 (1994), Barry Nicholas, The
French Law of Contract,Claredon Press Oxford, 2ed., p. 178 (1992); See to a broader extend

in the Netherlands, Arthur S. Harkamp and Mairanne M.M. Tillema, ContractLaw in the
Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, p. 35, 61 and 76 (1995). The authors clearly describe what the regime in the Netherlands is with the following:
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proper ground to enforce a contract concluded through the use of an electronic agent, although such contract would not be considered legally
valid.
Let us consider an example to demonstrate the point. A company
using an electronic agent has concluded a contract with a consumer. The
former created the appearance that the agent properly represented it or
created the appearance that, by concluding a contract through the computer; the latter directly concluded the contract with the company using
the agent. At this stage of the technology's development, the consumer
could reasonably claim that he ignored the fact that he was concluding a
contract with an electronic agent, and that he could not regard such contract as invalid. In such a case, one could argue that the company is fully
liable for creating such appearance and that any contract should therefore be enforceable against it. 3 °
The most attractive aspect of this theory is that it avoids any systematic solution, "letting a certain margin of maneuver to the judge who
will have to take into consideration exceptional situations where the
faith of the contracting party is not legitimate or the creation of the false
31
appearance is not the fact of the user of the electronic agent."
It is doubtful, however, that the theory of appearance could, in the
future, serve as a general ground to enforce contracts concluded by
means of electronic agents.
The practical results are similar to the theory of reliance: a party may be bound
beyond his will, if it is due to him that another, for good reason, believes he has
given his consent. In this case there is a valid contract, in contrast to the German
solution which admits the annulment of the contract followed by an action of the
relying party for its 'negatives Vertragsinteresse.'. . . It follows fro the principle of
consensulaism that, as a rule, the consent of the parties-or in a given case, the
reliance as to the existence of consent by the other party-suffices to establish a
valid contract.
Id. Note that the provisions on good faith may stop a party from asserting those above
mentioned rights against the other party. For a limited application of the theory in the
German agency law, see B.S. Markesinis, The German Law of Obligations,Clarendon Press
Oxford, p. 75 (1997).
30. On this point, see Perritt "in simplest terms, the law of agency binds a principal to
the acts of an agent within the agent's actual or apparent authority. If a principal mistakenly gives an agent actual authority, the principal nevertheless is bound by the agent's
acts. So also, if a principal makes a mistake in programming an electronic contracting
computer system, the principal actually has authorized the computerized agent and is
bound by its commitments. This conclusion is reinforced by apparent authority analysis.
...If a principal connects his computer to an electronic contracting system (or in an open
architecture adheres to electronic contracting protocols), he is in effect saying to the other
participants in that system,"here is my authorized agent". Then, if the agent enters into a
Transactionss that is not subjectively authorized by the principal, the principal is nevertheless bound because he created a situation in which it was reasonable for the others to
believe the agent had authority." Henry H. Perritt, JR., Law and the information superhighway, Wiley Law Publications, at 384 and 385 (1996).
31. Yves Poullet, supra note 10, at 11.
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First, the scope of the theory is actually limited in some countries.
In Belgium, for example, there is no general theory for the protection of
the legitimate trust and the theory of appearance would actually be limited to the legitimate trust of third parties. 32 In the case of agency, Belgian law accepts that a principal may be liable for the acts of a pseudoagent when a third party could reasonably believe that there was a valid
agency contract. The theory would not be extended to the relation of contractual parties, however, and it seems that the tendency of the case law
is to reject such an extension. 3 3 In the case of contracts formed by electronic agents, there are only two parties involved and a Belgian court
may refuse to apply the theory of agency.
Assuming that they would, this theory would not supply a feasible
solution once the use of electronic agents is generalized. Indeed, the theory requires that the party wishing to apply the theory to have acted in
good faith. This means that he should reasonably ignore the real situation. Once the use of electronic agents becomes generalized, would a
party still be able to argue he ignored the fact that he was contracting
with an electronic agent? Finally, one can wonder what will occur when
transactions occur between two electronic agents. In such a case, the
theory may hardly be applied since both parties have created an
appearance.
We are forced to conclude that the theory of appearance, assuming
that a court would extend it to the source of obligations between contractual parties, would only offer a proper solution for a limited period of
time and only when one party uses the electronic agent and has the capacity to exercise control of such an agent. This theory may be better
considered as a restrictive application of an objective view of contract
formation studied in the next section.
D.

WORKING ON THE NOTION OF ASSENT AND THE MEETING
OF THE MINDS

1. Assent and Meeting of the Minds in the Civil Law Countries
In civil law countries, there is only a contract when the parties intend to create legal relations by their mutual assent. To determine
whether there was a valid contract, judges will verify whether the parties subjectively intended to be bound by the contract.
32. S. Stijns, D. Van Gerven & P. Wry, supra note 27, at 694.
33. Id. at 694. Compare with the United States where the apparent theory in Agency
Law is based upon the fundamental theory of contracts, that is; where one manifests to
another that he is willing to contract upon specific terms which the other accepts, there is a
contract binding upon both parties (see Comment, Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency
§8 (1958). The US theory of contract will be discussed in our next section.
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Another solution to solve the problem of the validity of electronic
agents in civil law countries may therefore consist in reconsidering the
voluntary perception ("la perception volontariste") of the meeting of
minds. This has been suggested by Gautrais in order to solve the question of the automation of the contracts in the commerce made by EDI
transactions .34
According to Gautrais, the EDI contract is one situation that forces
reevaluation of the concept of the meeting of minds and its legal effects
in order to avoid the gap between theory and practice, guiding principles
and reality. 35 He recommends an utilitarist conception of the meeting of
minds, detached of its psychological and subjective definitions. Quoting
Mazeaud and Tancelin, he estimated that the reclassification of the will
on a simple, technical and utilitarian norm and not as a foundation of the
contract demonstrates that will is not absolute. Such reclassification
36
would generate an "objectivation" of the assent.
The author gives further examples in order to demonstrate that the
relational characteristic of the ED's agreements show us that we can
abstain from the true will of the parties and focus more on the parties'
respective situations.
A first example is the presumption that the parties create a binding
relation when certain indications, such as a continuous and permanent
business relationship, are shown. A second illustration is when a party
is bound by the sales terms of another party when he had the possibility
to read them, but failed to do so. In such a case the party is bound for
what he does rather than for what he intends. Finally, Gautrais reminds
the reader that according to contract law, silence may be37considered as
an acceptance under certain circumstances and customs.
Gautrais' theory is attractive. The examples quoted are not only
valid for EDI transactions, but correspond to general tendency in contract law. The above principles of explained protection of the legitimate
trust of third parties by the theory of appearance may serve as another
manifestation of the fact that assent is sometimes considered as more
the consequence of a state of mind than of will.
In the United States, the objective theory of assent became ascendant by the end of the nineteenth century and the courts universally accept it today.38 The United States has, however, adopted a set of rules
dealing with the problem of the use of electronic agents. We will attempt
to ascertain if that means that the objective theory of assent does not
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

V. Gautrais, supra note 22, at 242.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 236.
FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcTs § 3.6 (2d ed. 1998).
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properly address the question of validity of the use of electronic agents.
On the other hand, if it would be possible to further argue and recommend that civil law countries should adopt the objective theory of assent
in order to solve the question of contracts concluded automatically.
2.

The U.S. Objective Theory of Assent

According to the objectivists, a contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. 39 A party's subjective assent is not necessary to make a contract. The manifestation of
intention to agree, judged according to a standard of reasonableness, is
sufficient. The real but unexpressed state of the first party's mind is irrelevant. 40 It is enough that the other party had reason to believe that
41
the first party intended to agree.
So, "it is true that as a general principle, the inquiry will focus not
on the question of whether the subjective minds of the parties have met,
but on whether their outward of expression of assent is sufficient to form
a contract."4 2 According to this theory, does the objection that contracts
concluded by electronic agents would not be valid still make sense?
For Allen and Widdison, it is clear that "neither American nor English law, as they currently stand, would confer legal status on all computer-generated agreements." 43 For both authors, allowing computergenerated agreements would make an extension to contract doctrine. Indeed, when using electronic agents:
The parties not only have no knowledge of the precise terms of the
agreement, but they often have no knowledge that an agreement is being made. To add yet another exception to the rule that the existence of
agreement is to be determined by analyzing offer and acceptance analysis must raise the issue of whether the rule itself can and should continue to stand. Equally, the prospect that the impact of this further
exception to the traditional analysis of agreement will steadily grow in
importance until it completely overshadows the rule itself must cause
us to reflect that me may be departing too far from the traditional 'classical' concept of contract as being, in essence, the meeting of human
44
minds albeit from an objective point of view.
39. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 201 F. 664
(2d Cir. 1912), aftd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
40. Farnsworth on contracts, supra note 38, § 3.5.
41. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. App. 1907). See
also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the law of contracts, 76 Yale L.J., 951 (1967).
42. Williston on Contracts, § 4:1 at 241 (4d ed. 1990).
43. T. Allen & R. Widdison, supra, note 2, at 52.
44. Id. at 45.
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The authors are convinced that the traditional contractual theory
requires that the enforceability of the contract would depend upon
whether the computer was autonomous. If they are correct, one should
conclude that current contractual theory does not allow the use of all
kinds of electronic agents.
However, the proponents of this position may well be trapped in a
subjectivist approach of the meeting of minds. Indeed, they finally only
accept that an electronic agent conclude a contract when the performances of the computer are limited, when it acts only in accordance with
the person who has programmed it and when the terms of the contracts
are known in advance by the programmer. It seems therefore that for
programmers, electronic agents may be used only to prolong the will of
the person who is using the program. The subjectivists would allow exactly the same limited use through the theory of the preprogrammed
45
will.
The objective theory, however, permits us to go further, since, notably, a party's mental assent is not necessary to complete the transaction
and create legal obligations. Indeed, the above analysis shows that
many questions remained unanswered. For example, it would conform
with the objective theory to consider that the mere offering to a company
of the possibility to contract through the use of its electronic agent is a
sufficient outward of expression of assent to form a contract? Is the fact
that the company does not know the content and the moment of the contract formation relevant according to the objective theory? One answer
would be to consider that the assent may be expressed in any way including via an electronic agent and the fact that the contractual theory does
not require that a party must be aware of the exact time of the formation
and content of the contract.

E.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, many authors have attempted to legally justify the
use of electronic agents. It seems that the only way to allow their use
consists in relying on the objective theory of contracts. This requires an
evolution for the civil law countries since they still implement the subjective theory. For the United States and the United Kingdom, this approach requires a liberal interpretation of the objective doctrine, and it
remains uncertain how courts will react when confronted with the problem of enforcing a contract concluded by electronic agents.
For these reasons, the adoption of a law dealing with the question
might be highly recommendable to avoid uncertainty, particularly when
45. On this theory see, Lieve Elias, Jacques Gdrard, Gien Kuo Wang, Le droit des obligations face aux dchanges de donndes informatisdes, 8 Cahier du Crid, Kiuwer, Story-Scientia, Bruxelles, at 33 to 47 (1992).
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one of the hottest issues with the Internet is security. 46 We therefore
reject the European Union approach. Such approach, as already explained, 4 7 does not indeed foresee any specific provisions for the use of
electronic agent and only deals with the question of electronic agents in
the commentary of one article. Therefore, it does not provide the member states with any common guidelines to follow when the law does not
offer a firm solution.
What could be a clear regulatory solution to offer security to the
users of the Internet? Our next section will explore and critique the U.S.
attempt to deal with the question.
V.

THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS ACT

On July 24, 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on the
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), an organization whose purpose is to
prepare statutes for enactment uniformly among the United States,
passed the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).
UCITA is intended to, among other things, regulate e-commerce. UCITA
48
deals with the use of electronic agents on different sections.
After a brief overview of some historical considerations regarding
the adoption of UCITA and an analysis of its scope of application, we will
analyze its most relevant sections.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

UCITA is the result of an effort starting in 198849 the purpose of which
was to revise article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in light of technology-driven changes in commercial practices. In 1996, the NCCUSL
established a committee (the Drafting Committee on Electronic Communications in Contractual Transactions, later renamed the Drafting Committee on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act) charged to draft, in a
new Article 2B in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), necessary or
desirable provisions to support transactions utilizing existing and future
46. See for example Policy Considerations for Electronic Commerce, Discussion Paper,
World CommunicationDay, 1999, part 2: Building trust; available at the following address:
<httpJ/www.itu.intplwebcgi/fastweb?getdociew+www+9123+4++e-commerce>
(last visited December 13, 1999).
47. See the introduction of this paper.
48. Particularly sections 107, 112, 202, 206, and 214.
49. On the Uniform Commercial Code Revision Efforts, see the historical view related
by Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship between International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 Tulane Law Review, 1956 (1998).
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electronic or computerized technologies.5 0 The project to draft legal
rules in this area was originally considered necessary because courts
looking for guidance to resolve disputes in computer software transactions often applied by analogy the rules of Article 2 of the UCC even
though those rules might appear not relevant to the intangible rights to
information. 5 1 As Professor O'Rourke pointed out:
[Tihe sheer volume of commentary criticizing and defending Article 2B
illustrates its importance. It is the first effort to codify the law on transactions in information. As such, it is likely to provide a model not only
for other countries individually, but also for international movements to
52
unify laws applicable to cross-border transactions.
The draft of Article 2B was thus eagerly awaited. But at the end of a
long drafting process it became apparent that "transactions in intangible
information are quite different in fact from those for tangible goods, and
they cannot be appropriately integrated into the UCC Articles 2 and 2A
transactional framework which emphasizes transactions in goods". 5 3
Therefore the American Law Institute (ALI) and NCCUSL announced on
April 7, 1999 that Article 2B would no longer be pursued as a new UCC
Article to cover computer information transactions. Instead, NCCUSL,
without the co-sponsorship of the ALI, has renamed the proposed statute
UCITA. 5 4
The idea of passing such a model law to regulate electronic commerce does, however, not arouse unanimity and has a long history of controversy and objections. 55 The main critics to former Article 2B argued
that the project was premature in light of rapidly changing technology
and business practices.
Despite those critics, members of NCCUSL voted on UCITA at their
annual meeting in Denver on July 24, 1999.56 The proposal is now in the
50. The drafts of all projects and comments of the National Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws may be found at the Conference's official following web site: <httpJ/www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/ulclulc.htm (last visited, November 20, 1999).
51. Fred H. Miller and Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B's new uniform:A free-standingcomputer TransactionssAct, available at <httpJ/www.2bguide.com/docs/nuaa.html> (last visited, September 9, 1999).
52. Maureen A. OTRourke, Progressingtowards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 Berkeley Tech.L.J., 645 (1999).
53. Fred H. Miller and Carlyle C. Ring, supra note 51.
54. Jean Braucher, Why UCITA, like UCC Article 2B, is premature and unsound,
available at <httpJ/www.2bguide.com/docs/0499jb.html> (visited September 9, 1999).
55. Brenda Sandburg, E-commerce plan faces though fight, American Lawyer Media,
August 4, 1999.
56. In a state-by-state vote, 43 states approved UCITA, six opposed to it, two abstained, and two were not present at the voting. See Jack McCarthy, Nancy Weil and Jessica Davis, Users lose under new law; UCITA software legislation sent to states, InfoWorld,
August 2, 1999.
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57
stage of going to the various state legislatures for approval.

B.

SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS

Section 103 of UCITA provides the scope of application of the Act
and its exclusions. The Act applies to computer information transactions. It also deals with the question of "mixed" transactions (transactions involving computer information and other subject matter).
"Computer information transactions" are agreements that deal with the
creation, modification, access to, or distribution of computer information,
that is information that is in a form directly capable of being processed
by, or obtained from, a computer and any copy, associated documentation, or packaging. 58 The Act covers thus, for example, agreements involving access to or information from a computer system. 5 9 It also
applies to contracts to develop or create software and other computer information, such as a computer database. However, "the mere fact that
communications about a transactions are sent or recorded in digital form
60
does not place it within the scope of this Act".
To illustrate the exact scope of the Act, the comments provide the
example of a contract for airplane transportation. Such a contract is not
considered a computer information transaction, even though the ticket is
in digital form, since the subject matter is not the computer information,
but the service/air transportation from one location to another. 6 1 In the
same way, sales of goods or services contracts concluded through the Internet will not be within the scope of the Act. The electronic agents' provisions of the Act will therefore not regulate the vast majority of
contracts concluded by electronic agents. Such distinctions between the
kinds of operations concluded by the way of an electronic agent are open
to criticism. This further raises the question of the legal validity of
transactions not falling within the scope of the Act. One can wonder if
57. On February 13, 2000, the "Washington Post" announced that "Maryland and Virginia are racing to become the first states in the nation to approve new rules governing
electronic commerce, despite growing fears among legal experts that the laws could strip
away several basic consumer protections." [Matthew Mosk and Craig Timberg, States
Weigh new rules for E-Commerce, Washington Post, February 13, 2000, at C1. On March
14, 2000, both the "Washington Post" and the "New York Times" announced that Virginia
Gov. James S. Gilmore signed the nation's first set of contractual rules specifically governing electronic commerce into law. See Craig Timberg, Gilmore Signs 1st Internet Commercial Code Into Law, Washington Post, March 14, 2000 and Jeri Clausing, Virginia Is
First With ControversialSoftware Law, New York Times, March 14, 2000.
58. Section 102 (a) (10) and section 102 (a) (11).
59. For further examples, see Comments to Uniform Computer Information Transactionsss Act, draft for discussion only, October 15, 1999, p.13, available at <http-//www.law.
upenn.edu/library/ulclucita>, (last visited, Otober 19, 1999).
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 12.
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the courts will reason by analogy and apply those rules. The following
study of the provisions will try to deal with the question in order to determine if such reasoning is recommendable.
C.
1.

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL OBSERVATION

Definition

Section 102 (28) of UCITA defines "electronic agent" as "a computer
program or electronic or other automated means used independently to
initiate an action or respond to electronic messages or performances
without review or action by an individual at the time of the action, re6 2
sponse or performance."
The comments of this provision state that:
[The agent must act independently in a manner relevant to creation or
performance of a contract.... [Tihe automated system must have been
selected, programmed or otherwise used for that purpose by the person
that is bound by its operations. The legal relationship between the person and the automated agent is not fully equivalent to common law
agency, but takes into account that the "agent" is not human. Parties
who adopt use of electronic agents are ordinarily bound by the results of
63
their operation.
The comments speak for themselves and outline the legal regime of
the Act. The authors of UCITA, conscious that the law of agency cannot
be applied, try to construct something similar by creating an obligatory
64
link between the machine and the person for whom the machine acts.
The wish to confer a link between the machine and a party is comprehensible. After all, as Nimmer (one of the UCITA's Reporters) has pointed
out, referring to Section 107 of UCITA, "if a party creates- a situation in
which an electronic agent is to act on its behalf, then a party is bound by
the actions of the 'agents.'"6 5 Yet, the reference to the law of agency is
clumsy. As the first part of our analysis shows, a machine cannot be an
agent since the machine does not have the capacity to contract and it
does not make sense to confer it such capacity.6 6 This is why Gautrais,
commenting on the UCC provisions of Article 2B 6 7 on electronic agents,
reminds us that the obligatory link ("lien d'attribution") cannot work because it brings a machine, which legally does not have any capacity to
62. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(28).
63. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(28), Reporter's Note.
64. Lionel Thoumyre, L'dchange de consentement dans le commerce glectronique,available at <http'//www.juriscom.net/universite/doctrine/article4.htm> (last visited, October
10, 1999), p.1 3 .
65. Raymond T. Nimmer, The uniform commercial code proposed article 2B symposium: article 2B: an introduction, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info.L. 211, at 231 (1997).
66. See part IV, section A and B.
67. Actually incorporated in the U.C.I.T.A. §§ 102 (28) and 107.
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contract, into the matter. 68 Thoumyre, however, objects to the view that
if a party agrees with the remarks concerning agency theory, then it
must moderate the assertion with regard to the liability derived from
ownership.6 9 Indeed, he said that in tort law a party may be liable for a
damages generated by an object. 70 Therefore, the law already allows the
possibility of an obligatory link between a machine and a person. In our
opinion, however, it is dangerous to introduce tort principles into contractual issues. The issue we are dealing with is the validity of a contract and it seems inappropriate to solve it by calling upon tort
principles.
2.

Legal Recognition of Electronic Record and Authentication; Use of
Electronic Agents

Section 107(d) of UCITA states that "a person that uses its own electronic agent for authentication, performance, or agreement, including
manifestation of assent, is bound by the operations of the electronic
agent, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's opera71
tions or the results of the operations."
The preceding sub-section already insisted on the problem created
by the obligatory link. Section 107 does therefore not give rise to other
comments. Before turning to the analysis of another article, let us mention that this section clearly state that contracts can be concluded and be
perfectly valid even when the individual is unaware of the involvement
of the electronic agent. This resolves any legal uncertainties regarding
future use of autonomous electronic agents.
3.

Manifesting Assent; Opportunity to Review

a.

Rules
Section 112 (b) of UCITA provides that:
[Ain electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after having an opportunity to review, the electronic agent: (1) authenticates the
record; or (2) engages in operations that the circumstances indicate constitute acceptance. Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be
shown in any manner, including a showing that a person or an electronic agent obtained or used the information or informational rights
and that a procedure existed by which a person or an electronic agent
must have engaged in the conduct or operations in order to do so. An
electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record or term only if
the record or term is made available in manner that would enable a
reasonably configured agent to react to the record or term."
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gautrais, supra note 21, at 240 and 241.
Thoumyre, supra note 64, at 13.
Id.
U.C.I.T.A_ § 107(d)
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Critical Observations

The first remark that comes to mind when reading this section concerns the ability of a machine to manifest assent separately from the
person who programmed it. Aware of such objection, the authors of
UCITA indicate in their comments that the important question is
whether, in the overall circumstances, the electronic operations indicate
assent.7 2 The proof of the acceptance may be shown in any manner.
This is nothing more than an application of the objective theory. On
their third point, the official comments of Section 112 insist that the
traditional contract principle of objective assent is "especially important
in electronic commerce where many transactions do not involve contact
between individuals. Parties on both sides must rely on objective acts
indicating acceptance... Doctrine of mistake as well as the law relating
to fraud and duress apply in appropriate cases." 73 One therefore expresses doubt about the utility of creating a distinction between assent
by conduct and assent by electronic agents. Speaking of assent by electronic agents is a heresy. Part IV demonstrated that a machine has no
capacity and the comments themselves recognize that "when dealing
with electronic agents, assent cannot be based on knowledge or reason to
know since program are capable of neither.... ."74 The machine does not
create the overall circumstances that generate an assent, but rather the
person who uses the machine.
Assent by conduct is described as an assent that:
[Oiccurs if a person acts (or fails to act) having reason to know its behavior will be viewed by the other party as indicating assent ... assent
... focuses on objective factors, including whether there was an act or a
failure to act voluntary engaged in with reason to know that inference
of assent will be drawn. Actions objectively indicating assent are
effec75
tive even though the actor may subjectively intend otherwise.
It seems logical and certainly simpler to consider that a person can express his assent by conduct when using an electronic agent.
The distinction between assent by conduct and assent by an electronic agent becomes even more absurd when we are confronted with the
72. It is clear from the comments of this article. . . . "when dealing with electronic
agent assent, that assent can not be based on knowledge or reason to know of the principal
since programs are capable of neither and since the remote, automated in nature of the
interaction may preclude either individual party from any awareness." [Comments to the
Uniform Computer Information Transactionsss Act, supra note 56, at 28.] For a general
comment of this provision, see Holly Y. Towle, On-line selected issues in contracts, 557 PLI/
Pat, 715, at 725 (1999).
73. Id., at 28.
74. Id. at 28.
75. Comments to the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, supra note 59,
at 28.
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question of when the electronic agent has had an opportunity to review
the records. Indeed, for both electronic agents and individuals the Act
says that manifesting assent requires an opportunity to review.
Section 112 (e) (2) of UCITA states that "an electronic agent has an
opportunity to review a record or term only if the record or term is made
available in manner that would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or term." 76 Therefore, an assent only
exists if the electronic agent was able to react to the record. But no one
knows what a "reasonably configured electronic agent" is. 7 7 Even for a
software practitioner like Davis, it is unclear "what is meant by a manner in which the agent could not react ....
The abilities of a typical
software agent to understand and react will be limited more by the effort
78
expended by its creator than the state of the art."
All of this demonstrates that a much more satisfactory solution to
allow the use of electronic agents in the process of making contracts
would be to consider that a person's assent to a contract is presumed
when using an electronic agent, even though he may subjectively intend
otherwise or does not have a particular knowledge of the moment and
the exact content of the contract. If necessary, some provision could be
added to ensure the right application of consumer law and the law that
79
applies in case of mistake.
4.

Formation in General

Section 202 (a) of UCITA states that "a contract may be formed in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and acceptance
or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic agents which recognize the existence of a contract."8 0
This section does not raise comments other than those already provided in the other subsections of our analysis. It illustrates the objective
approach of the contract and the fact that the authors of the Act attempt
to associate electronic agents as human agents.
5.

Offer and Acceptance; Electronic Agents

This section deals with contracts formed by the interaction between
electronic agents, or between an individual (acting on the individual's
76. U.C.I.T.A. §112(e).
77. A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as legal Software for Electronic Contracting-Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 Berkley Technology Law Journal, 1051 (1998). This
author further argues that the Act constitutes a significant weakening of consumer protection in the electronic world.
78. James Raymond Davis, On Self-Enforcing Contracts, The Right To Hack, and Willfully Ignorant Agents, 13 BERKzLEY TECHNOLOGY LAw JouNAL, 1148 (1998).
79. See hereafter Section VII, section A and B (mistake and unconscionability).
80. U.C.I.T.A. § 202(a).
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own behalf or for another person such as a company) and an electronic
agent.
It follows the philosophy of the other articles. Most of the provisions, especially those concerning electronic mistake and fraud, appear
useless if one adopts the view that electronic agents are only used by a
person as a way to express his assent. In such a case, existing contract
principles may apply without any need of further legislation.

D. CONCLUSION
The brief overview of UCITA raises some doubts about how the
question of electronic agents has been addressed.
First, the limited scope of application of UCITA is a problem. Most
of the transactions involving an electronic agent will fall outside its scope
of application. Regarding the complexity of the regime and its various
critics, it remains uncertain and ill-advised that courts follow the UCITA
approach. This could lead to a dual legal regime, which is always subject
to criticism.
Second, we are troubled by UCITA's provisions, particularly their
uselessness, ambiguity and complexity. The comparison with agency
law is clumsy and there is no need to distinguish between assent by conduct and assent by electronic agents. 8 ' The objective theory of assent
could reach the same result. Assuming that the scope of UCITA will not
be enlarged, courts could find the objective theory a better source for reasoning by analogy. The only section that appears relevant is Section 107.
This section, as we have seen, dispels any uncertainties that may remain
regarding the conclusion of contracts by autonomous agents.
VI.

SOME LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS

Criticism is an easy way out and should not be made without suggesting any other proposals.
At the end of its Section IV, this article expressed the opinion that
there was probably a need for legislation to clarify the legal use of electronic agents. It later expressly rejected the American approach. The
reader is now faced with the ticklish question of what would be a good
alternative rule. The present study has shown that for both civil law and
common law countries, an objective approach to the contract's formation
might help. A solution should be found by working on this concept.
In assuming responsibility for proposing recommendations as to the
content of an act that could be adopted in different law systems, the following example comes to mind:
81. Contra,Jeff C. Dodd and James A. Hernandez, supra note 14, at 8: "We certainly
do not criticize article 2B's approach to electronic agents".
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"In a contract, one or both party can manifest his assent by using a
computer program or other automated means. In such a case, the contract is valid even if such party was not aware or has not reviewed the
automated operation or the result of such operation."
Such definition should avoid systematic solution and let judges a
certain margin of maneuver.
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
A.

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the preceding section of this analysis, we recommended
an approach to validate a contract concluded by means of an electronic
agent. Our solution relies upon the objective approach of the contract
formation.
This new way to conclude contracts should, however, not obscure basic problems that may arise when electronic agents are widely used especially by consumers.
On the one hand, buyers will often want to set aside contracts simply because they made a bad deal. They will attempt to invoke doctrines
like mistake and unconscionability to serve their personal ends. Alternatively, some unscrupulous sellers may take advantage of the widespread use of electronic agents and the limits of the technology to fashion
contracts offering no warranties or being disadvantageous to the
unknowledgeable consumer. Finally, electronic agents may not work
properly at all.
Legally, this may generate confusion. Does the actual law regime
offer prompt solutions to these two basic problems of mistake and unconscionability? How could it be improved? This is the focus of the following
discussion.
B.

MISTAKE

The use of electronic agents may enhance the creation of mistake in
the contracts. Let us show by means of an example what the problems
may be and how to solve them.
1. Presentationof the Case
A retail bookstore wants to purchase 100 copies of a new book. The
owner of the store dispatches an electronic agent with instructions to buy
the books from the wholesaler who offers the best price. The electronic
agent concludes a contract with the Jones Wholesale Book Company to
buy 100 copies of the book for $1,000. Later, the bookstore owner discovers that the electronic agent made a mistake: the books were available
from the Smith Wholesale Book Company for only $500. The owner

1999]

ELECTRONIC AGENTS QUESTIONED

seeks to avoid the contract with Jones. Should he be allowed to do So?82
For the purpose of our analysis of the case we will successively consider that the mistake may be due to two different reasons:
The mistake was due to a flaw in the original programming of the electronic agent. For example, the program would not look at sellers whose
names begin with "S".
The mistake was due to a system failure that was the fault of neither
the bookstore owner nor any wholesaler. For example, just as the agent
was looking at the prices at the Smith company, a power surge hampered the agent's functioning.
2. ProposedSolutions According to the Common and Civil Laws
a. Mistake Due to the Original Programming
The law is currently not without answers regarding mistakes generated by the negligence of a third party. An analogy may be drawn with a
misunderstanding as to the terms of an agreement caused by errors in
the transmission of a telegram when the terms of the offer have changed
because the offer has not properly handled by the telegraph clerk.8 3 In
such a case, the validity of the contract will depend upon the importance
of the mistake. If the offeree knows or has any reason to know that a
change in the offer has occurred, he has no power to bind the offeror by
an acceptance of the offer as delivered. 84 So the price at which goods are
offered for sale may be so greatly reduced that a reasonable man would
suspect an error. The offeree is not permitted to "snap up" such an
85
offer.
Similarly, if the electronic agent of a buyer agrees to purchase a
book for $4,000 instead of $40, the mistake should be evident to a reasonable person. In such a case, a common law court should allow the buyer
to avoid the contract. Otherwise, the consequences of the mistake would
82. Price errors are maybe not the best examples of problems that may arise, since a
company, in order to keep the client, may be willing to settle the problems (see for example

the current attitude of sellers- such as Amazon- on the Web; Bob Tedeschi, On the Web
Pricing errorscan be costly in more ways than one, N.Y. Times, December 13, 1999, at C1.
The example quoted is to facilitate the understanding of the thesis. There are many types
of errors that can be imagined ....
To provide another example, imagine that you configured the electronic agent as to only deal with web site owners that respect your privacy... What happens if your electronic agent communicates your data to a web site that
does not and excludes such respect of the privacy in its terms and conditions?
83. In the same way, see Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic contracting:Legal issues, 14
J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., 238-239 (1996).
84. CoaBIN ON CoNrRACIS § 105 at 470 (1963).

85. Cal.- GermainFruit Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 P. 658, 137 Cal. 598 (1902).
Mass.- Holtz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 3 N.E.2d 180, 294 Mass. 543 (1936); all quoted by
Corbin, supra note 75.
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be too serious and inequitable. 86
In the case at hand, however, there is no way to conclude that the
price was unreasonable. The electronic agent just fails to find the cheapest one. There is no way to argue that a contract has not been made.
Coming back to the telegraphic mistake, when the offeree has no
reason to know that a change has been made to the initial offer by
mistake:
[Ilt is said that one of the parties has "assumed the risk" of telegraphic
mistake, this one being either the one who sent the telegraph in question, or the one who first used the telegraph, or the one who suggested
that it be used. Perhaps, a reason for choosing the sender of the telegram instead of the receiver to take the first impact of the loss can be
found in actual
business practices and mores or in business
87
convenience.
Regarding this, it is likely that a court will follow the same reasoning that Corbin uses:
[A}s between the sender and the receiver, the party who selects the telegraph as the means of communication shall bear the loss caused by the
errors of the telegraph. The first proposer can select one of many modes
of communication, both for the proposal and 88
the answer. The receiver
has no such choice, except as to this answer.
A court should therefore conclude that the retail bookstore has no
way to contest the contract made and will have to support the risks inherent to the use of an electronic agent.8 9 Eventually, it will have as its
only remedy an action against the programmer of the software to be indemnified for the loss depending on the content of the contract (the
programmer may have taken care to preclude liability in such a
situation).
Civil law countries do not fundamentally differ in their solutions to
this problem. The solution in case of price mistake may disfavor the user
of the electronic agent even more since some countries, such as Belgium,
do not allow the nullity of contracts in case of mistake regarding the
price. 90 Furthermore, the doctrine is quite clear: The user of a computer
system shall assume its risks. 9 1
86. Corbin on contracts § 610 at 695 (1960).
87. Id. at 471-472.
88. Id. at 472.
89. In certain cases both parties may have used electronic agents. In the presence of
any mistake, the reasoning may be more complex since the primary task will be to identify
which electronic agent generated the mistake.
90. See for example Catherine Goux, L'erreur, le dol et la lesion qualifiee: analyse et
comparaisons, Thdorie g6ndrale des obligations; Formation permanente CUP, Vol. XXVII,
at 25 (December 1998).
91. Hervd Croze, Note sous Cass. 6 novembre 1984, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, at 535-536
(1985).
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Mistake Due to a System FailureCaused by an Act of God

The same reasoning will prevail for mistake generated by a system
failure due to an act of God. The electronic agent's user will have to
assume all consequences of the mistake except when the mistake is perceptible to a reasonable person. In this case, however, the retail user
bookstore, user of the electronic agent, will not have any recourse
against the software's programmer except as provided by the contract he
had entered into to.
3.

Proposed Solution According to the UCITA

UCITA does not create any particular rules regarding contracts
formed by electronic mistake. However, Section 206 (a) provides that:
A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents. If the
interaction results in the electronic agents engaging in operations that
the circumstances indicate constitute acceptance, a contract is formed
but a court may grant appropriate relief
if the operations resulted from
92
fraud, electronic mistake, or the like.
According to the comments of the Act, this subsection:
makes clear that applying restrictions analogous to common law concepts of fraud and mistake is appropriate in this automated context to
prevent abuse or clearly unexpected results. Courts applying these concepts may refer to cases involving mistake or fraud doctrine even though
an electronic
agent cannot actually be said to have been misled or
93
mistaken.
However, the above passages do not solve the problem of electronic
mistake. On the contrary, the italicized sentence once again demonstrates the inappropriate humanization of the computer denounced in
the first part of the analysis. This part of the sentence does not help, but
rather generates more confusion. This confusion is enhanced by the fact
that subsection (b), which deals with contracts formed by the interaction
of an electronic agent and an individual, does not make any reference to
the common law concept of mistake.
4. Consequence and Suggestions
The application of the common law regime to the electronic mistake
generated by the use of electronic agents is appropriate. There is no
need to create new rules when the existing one offers a proper answer.
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that a person who decides to use
software to make his transactions will bear the consequences of such use.
This approach, followed by both legal systems, gives the user an incen92. U.C.I.T.A. § 206(a).
93. Comments to the Uniform Computer Information Transactionsss Act, supra note
59, at 41 (underlined supplied).
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tive to make sure he carefully chooses his electronic agent. However,
this could sometimes lead to unfair situations, especially when a consumer has used an electronic agent following a repetitive and convincing
advertising on the Web, without understanding the consequences of his
decision. Holding someone responsible for the risks taken is fair, as long
as he can appreciate such risks. But general understanding of computer
principles and risks varies greatly among Internet users. Therefore a
consumer may quickly be the victim of an electronic agent because he is
not able to appreciate the extent of the technical capacities. In the end,
consumers will mistrust the electronic agents and will no longer use
them. How can we avoid these situations? One can suggest different
tracks of reflection.
One rigid approach consists in imposing by the law certain technical
standards with which electronic agents must conform before any commercialization. Programmers could not propose any electronic agent
services without first ensuring that they are in conformance with the
law. In addition, the law could limit programmers' abilities to exempt
themselves from liability. Establishing technical criteria by law is not
easy, however, since such criteria should not prevent technological
evolution.
A more flexible approach would implement voluntary labeling of
electronic agents. Site labeling is the combination of technology and audit procedures. It is achieved through an audit procedure estimating the
compliance of the site with provisions applying to the field of consumer
protection, security, and protection of privacy. Labeling presents a commercial argument: it attests that the Web site is willing to respect certain criteria and takes into consideration clients' interests. 94 Labeling
could therefore give consumers the insurance that some experts have audited the ability of the electronic agent to function properly. Labeling
recommendations can be combined with an obligation for the programmer to indicate, on the first page of the Web site, proposing the service of
the electronic agent, and stating in bold type, when an electronic agent
has not been the subject of an audit.

94. On the advantages and the different ways of labeling in the Internet world, see
Didier Gobert & Anne Salauin, La labellisation des sites web: classification, stratdgies et
recommandations, 51 DAOR 83 (1999), Didier Gobert & Anne Salain, La labellisationdes
sites web: inventaires des initiatives existantes, 35 Communications & Strategies 229
(1999). Among the initiatives inventoried, see those of WebTrust (<httpi//cpawebtrust.
org>), BBB OnLine (<http-//bbbonline.org>), TRUSTe (<http://www.truste.org>) (last visited: January 16, 2000).
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C.

UNCONSCIONABILITY

The recognition of the validity of contracts concluded by electronic
agents may create another problem. As pointed out by Harrison when
discussing a former project of the UCITA:
The "objective assent" model assumes that the consumer has a duty to
read and understand the contract. The objective assent approach views
assent as an act that demonstrates, generally, one's assent to the contract. Such manifestation of assent is deemed to be assent to all of the
contract terms, whether or not they are read and understood. Article
2B's heavy reliance on the objective approach suffers infirmities when
applied to the newly developed click-wrap agreement and Internet
95
medium.
Such a remark may also be made with regard to the use of electronic
agents. How can the user of an electronic agent be held by terms and
conditions he has no possibility of reading and understanding? What
happens if a very unsophisticated agent makes a contract with a company that excludes all warranties and sells an inferior product? Under
European law, the risks for the consumer are not too important since
national legislations provide many rules excluding certain types of provisions or imposing others, taking into consideration the weak position of
the consumer. 9 6 However, the problem is a real one. It has caused
Froomkin to consider that one can reasonably expect that electronic
agent-based transactions "cannot be consummated without first actually
securing some manifestation of approval by the electronic agent's human
97
principal."
UCITA inadequately deals with the question in Section 112 (e) (2),
providing that "an electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record
or term only if the record or term is made available in manner that
would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the rec95. Zachary M. Harrison, Just click here: Article 2B's failure to guarantee adequate
manifestation of assent in click-wrap contracts, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J.907, at 937 (1998).
96. See for example, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts, O.J., L 095, at 0029 (1993).
97. A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as legal softaware for electroniccontracting - Operating system or Trojan Horse?, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1023 , at 1054-1055 (1998). For
the author,
... codification of a rule generally making people responsible for the acts of their
electronic agents changes little in substance, while usefully removing any doubts
that might exist about the validity of agent-based commerce. It does not necessarily follow, however, that agent-based commerce is appropriate for all-type of
Transactions. In particular, given how little is know about how agent-based commerce might work at the consumer level, if a state consumer law rule requires
conspicuousness, one might reasonably expect that a uniform rule would say that
those Transactions can not be consummated without first actually securing some
manifestation of approval by the electronic agent's human principal.
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ord or term."9 8 We have already discussed the limit of such an assertion
and recommended that a contract concluded by an electronic agent
should be valid even if the party using the electronic agent has not reviewed the automated operation or the result of such operation. 99 In
fact, the capacity of the software agent will be more limited by the effort
expanded by its creator or user. It is therefore a priori that the protection must be afforded. We agree with Froomkin on the importance of
securing some manifestations of the electronic agent user's approval of
the terms and conditions. But those may be done when the agent is being programmed. By giving clear and complete instructions to the agent,
the user reduces the risks of unfair surprises regarding the content of
the terms and conditions. This obviously supposes that the electronic
agent (i) meets a certain degree of sophistication (ii) does not accept contracts with other terms or conditions than those specified by the user,
and (iii) keeps a record of the instructions it received for evidence
purposes.
The first condition may be fulfilled by resorting to one of the solutions described in the previous section (i.e. minimum technical requirements or labeling) and by giving the user many alternatives amongst the
terms and conditions his electronic agent may be faced with. The second
condition is linked to the first one. In addition, when the agent does not
find any offeror responding to the requirements of the user, we can imagine that the electronic agent, instead of concluding the contract, only provides the user with a list of offerors' proposing contracts that slightly
differ from his requirements (i.e. by providing a list of Web sites that
offer the product the user is looking for, but that satisfy only four of the
six conditions required). Finally, the record is also important. In a suit
against the programmer of the electronic agent the user may serve, in
case of error, evidence of the instructions given by the user.
These minimal warranties should protect consumers against unfair
surprises and keep the judge's margin of appreciation intact by allowing
him to maintain his power of cancellation of a contract when, for example, a seller has taken measures to induce an electronic agent to commit
a mistake.
VIII.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

One of the aims of this article has been to analyze the validity of
contracts concluded by means of electronic agents by researching a solution that could adequately address concerns that common law and civil
law countries may have. This article has demonstrated that the current
legal regime unsatisfactorily deals with this issue. The European view is
98. U.C.I.T.A. § 112(e)(2).
99. See Part one, section V point C § 3.
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certainly inadequate. In attempting to suggest a new law, we have rejected the American approach embodied in UCITA. This analysis ultimately concludes that the notion of assent appears to be desirable and
seems to be the price we most pay to maintain the coherence of contract
law.
Rather than the validity of the contract, the major challenge posed
by electronic agents is placed on minimum technical requirements and
warranties. Electronic agents should be required to have these precursors before being offered to the consumers in order to reduce the risks of
mistakes and unconscionability.
The development of the use of electronic agents may finally appear
as a chance for the consumer. By creating an instrument that allows the
consumer to indicate the minimum of protection he wishes in the terms
and conditions of a contract, sellers will be encouraged to create clear,
and protective terms and conditions. Well used, electronic agents may
actually help consumers not familiar with disclaimers and therefore reduce the imbalance between buyers and sellers.
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